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THE HOOVER COMMISSION REPORTS
ON FEDERAL REORGANIZATION
JOHN W. LEDERLE*
This year, more than at any time in American history, public at-
tention is being focused on the organization and management of the
federal government. The extensive publicity attendant upon the in-
vestigations and recommendations of the Commission on the Organiza-
tion of the Executive Branch of the Government,' commonly known
as the Hoover Commission, has for the first time made the average
citizen conscious of administrative principles heretofore little discussed
outside the class room or the bureaucracy. It will take leadership to
marshall this new public awareness in support of a constructive pro-
gram of administrative reorganization. The legal profession, as always,
must supply much of this leadership.
One thing is clear: The problem of executive branch organization
is a big one! The federal government in recent years has impressed
many citizens as being more like a menacing octopus than a servant of
the people. Since the 1920's the number of civilian employees has
grown from 570,000 to over 2,000,000; the number of bureaus, sections,
services and units has quadrupled to over 1,800; annual federal expen-
ditures have jumped from $3,600,000,000 to more than $42,000,000,000;
*A.M., LL.B., Ph.D., University of Michigan; Associate Professor of Political
Science and Director of Curriculum, Institute of Public Administration, Uni-
versity of Michigan; General Counsel, Michigan Municipal League; Secretary-
Treasurer, Michigan Municipal Attorneys' Association; Consultant to 1944
and 1946 National Campaign Expenditures Committees, United States Senate.
'The Commission's findings and recommendations are set forth in nineteen
separate reports (available from the Superintendent of Documents, U. S.
Government Printing Office) as follows: 1. General Management of the
Executive Branch ($20); 2. Personnel Management ($.25); 3. Office of
General Services-Supply Activities ($.20); 4. The Post Office ($.10); 5.
Foreign Affairs ($.25); 6. Department of Agriculture ($.20) ; 7. Budgeting
and Accounting ($.35); 8. The National Security Organization ($.15); 9.
Veterans Affairs ($.15); 10. Department of Commerce ($.15) ; 11. Treasury
Department ($.15); 12. Regulatory Commissions ($.15) ; 13. Department of
Labor ($.15); 14. Interior Department ($.30) ; 15. Social Security, Education
and Indian Affairs ($.25) ; 16. Medical Activities ($.25) ; 17. Business Enter-
prises ($.40) ; 18. Overseas Administratio--Federal-State Relations-Federal
Research ($.20) ; 19. Concluding Report ($.60). The reports were published
between January and May, 1949, and are listed in chronological order of
publication. For the best detailed summary of these reports see "Summary
of Reports of the Hoover Commission," 9 Public Administration Review
73-99 (1949).
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the annual debt per average family has shot up from approximately
$500 to about $7,500.2 It is little wonder that many citizens look back
with nostalgic yearnings to the 1920's.
Yet the clock is not likely to be turned back. The impact of the
Depression led the federal government into many new areas of regu-
lation of private enterprise or of direct social service. The impact of
World War II and the universal recognition of America's inevitable
involvement in international problems, has influenced the growth and
costs of the federal government even more than did the Depression.3
While it is conceivable that cutbacks in some services might be made,
economizers in our national legislature are never able to marshall more
than generalized support. When the economizers point to specific spots
where cuts should be made, their brothers jump ship. Big Government
is with us and is likely to stay.
As Woodrow Wilson pointed out in his classic essay, "The Study
of Administration", the expansion of governmental services, with con-
sequent enlargement of personnel, geographical area and expenditures,
has inevitably called for a shift of emphasis in the study of govern-
ment. Lawyers and political scientists for centuries devoted their at-
tention to the problem of the constitution of government to the exclu-
sion of the problem of its administration. In Wilson's words, "The
question was always: Who shall make law, and what shall that law be?
The other question, how the law should be administered with enlighten-
ment, with equity, with speed, and without friction, was put aside as
'practical detail' which clerks could arrange after doctors had agreed
upon principles."' 4 Calling for a new science of administration, Wilson
concluded: "The weightier debates of constitutional principle are even
yet by no means concluded; but they are no longer of more immediate
practical moment than questions of administration. It is getting to be
harder to run a constitution than to frame one." 5
While study of federal administration should be continuous and
systematic, it has been our practice to make such investigations only at
intervals. The Commission on Economy and Efficiency during Presi-
dent Taft's administration did some noteworthy work.6 The President's
2 Report on General Management of the Executive Branch, p. viii.
3 On p. 4 of its Concluding Report we find this significant comment, "It now
costs more each year to pay the interest on the national debt than it did to
pay the total cost of the Federal Government 16 years ago."
4 Woodrow Wilson's essay originally appeared in 1887 in Volume 2 of the
Political Science Quarterly at p. 197. In 1941 it was reprinted in Volume 56
of the Political Science Quarterly at p. 481 and the quotation is from pp. 482-
483 of this reprint.
5 56 Political Science Quarterly, p. 484.
6 See Message of the President of the U. S. Submitting for the Consideration
of the Congress a Budget, (Sen. Doc. No. 1113, 62 Cong. 3 Sess.); Message
of the President of the U. S. Transmitting the Reports of the Commission
on Economy and Efficiency (House Doc. No. 1252, 62 Cong., 3 Sess.); Mes-
sage of the President of the U. S. on Economy and Efficiency in the Govern-
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Committee on Administrative Management, which reported in 1937,7
focused attention on the Topsy-like growth of federal agencies and
called for rational solution rather than the usual policy of ad hoc im-
provisation. Finally, the problems associated with the transition from
war to peace, from an isolationist to an internationalist position, led
to the establishment in 1947 of the Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government.
The chairman of this latest investigating body turned out to be
Herbert Hoover,8 a man of wide experience, but a man whose social
philosophy and outlook were notoriously unsympathetic with recent
trends toward a Welfare State. For those concerned about present
governmental trends the name of Herbert Hoover lends conservative
testimonial value to the Commission's conclusions and his association
with the investigation should do much to allay the suspicions of those
who would be quick to smell a New Deal or Fair Deal whitewash.
The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government was established by virtue of Public Law 162, 80th Con-
gress, approved by President Truman on July 7, 1947. Section 1 of
the Act is a declaration of policy of the Congress to promote "economy,
efficiency and improved service" in the executive branch of the Gov-
ernment by:
"(1) limiting expenditures to the lowest amount consistent
with the efficient performance of essential services, activities,
and functions;
"(2) eliminating duplication and overlapping of servies, ac-
tivities, and functions;
"(3) consolidating services, activities, and functions of a
similar nature;
"(4) abolishing services, activities, and functions not neces-
sary to the efficient conduct of government; and
"(5) defining and limiting executive functions, services, and
activities."
This language and the statements by Congressmen during com-
mittee hearings on the Act are eloquent testimony to the economy-
mindedness of supporters of the Commission idea. Despite Mr.
Hoover's subsequent press statements about the millions to be saved
by adoption of this or that Commission reorganization proposal, drastic
reductions in the cost of the federal government are not to be expected.
went Service 2 Vols. (House Doc. 458, 62 Cong., 2 Sess.); The Need for a
National Budget (House Doc. No. 854, 62 Cong., 2 Sess.).
7See President's Committee on Administrative Management, Report with
Special Studies (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1937).
sThe other distinguished members of the Commission were Dean Acheson,
Vice-chairman, Arthur S. Fleming, James Forrestal, George H. Mead, George
D. Aiken, Joseph P. Kennedy, John L. McClellan, James K. Pollock, Clarence
S. Brown, Carter Manasco, James H. Rowe, Jr.
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Indeed, economy is likely to prove an illusion if made the prime ob-
jective of reorganization.
Large reductions in the cost of government will only come about
through large reductions in services and activities. Scrutiny of the
Commission's mandate reveals no lack of authority to question the
wisdom of existing federal programs and the level of federal services.
Nevertheless the Commission "focused its attention mainly on how
efficiently present services were being performed, rather than on the
question of whether they should or should not be performed." Gen-
erally eschewing recommendations about governmental policy as being
more properly in the domain of Congressional determination, the Com-
mission restricted itself to the relatively mechanical task of rearrang-
ing and revising existing agencies. Such an approach is hardly calcu-
lated to bring about substantial reduction in federal governmental
costs.10 The Commission, in effect, tossed the ball back to Congress.
Even had the Hoover Commission seriously recommended reduction
of federal functions, that would not necessarily have meant reduction
in overall governmental costs. As citizens supporting state and local
governments, not merely the federal government alone, we should be
perfectly clear that when the federal government sloughs off a particu-
lar service, it invariably is taken up as a service by the state or local
governments. What appears as an economy by the federal government
is in practice very likely to turn up on the budget of another level of
government as a new service.
Section 3 of the Act provided that the Commission should be com-
posed of twelve members as follows:
"(1) Four appointed by the President of the United States,
two from the executive branch of the Government and two from
private life;
"(2) Four appointed by the President pro tempore of the
Senate, two from the Senate and two from private life; and
"(3) Four appointed by the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives, two from the House of Representatives and two from
private life."
Of each class of two members to be thus appointed one member was
to be from each of the two major political parties. It was felt that
by this method of organization, in which the legislative as well as
executive branches would be represented, in which party politics would
be in balance, legislative-executive and party suspicions and antagon-
isms might be alleviated and objective conclusions arrived at.
9 Concluding Report, p. 3.
10 Cf. Ferrel Heady, "The Reports of the Hoover Commission," 11 Review of
Politics 355, at pp. 376-377.
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The earlier President's Committee on Administrative Management
had been initiated by the President alone. Its three private-citizen
members were appointed by the President without legislative interven-
tion. Because of its independent origin, Congress was suspicious, if not
resentful. Enactment into law of the Committee's recommendations
was subsequently drowned in the cry "Dictator Bill." The Hoover
Commission, in contrast, is a product of legislative-executive coopera-
tion.
But the attempt to meet one problem in this manner meant the
creation of new ones in a different area. In the desire to secure major
party balance as well as legislative, executive and private citizen repre-
sentation, the Commission grew to the almost unwieldy number of
twelve. Such a large body, recruited from such a variety of back-
grounds, suffered from inability to agree. Basic principles of admin-
istration needed to be watered down in the process of securing un-
animity. The executive and legislative members tended to reflect in
uncompromising terms the views of the constituency from which they
were appointed. The private citizen members, like Mr. Hoover himself,
often found it difficult as Commissioners to accept or support Congres-
sional policies as to federal functions after they had devoted their lives
to attacking them. These factors in part explain why the various
Hoover Commission reports lack the internal coherence, unanimity and
beauty of style which characterized the Report of the President's Com-
mittee on Administrative Management.
The experiment with legislators as members did not work out en-
tirely as planned. The Senators and Representatives selected were,
generally speaking, the ranking majority and minority members of the
Committees on Expenditures in the Executive Departments of the
respective Houses. When the 81st Congress assembled, Senator Aiken
was no longer a member of the Senate Committee and Congressman
Brown had likewise ceased to be a member of the House Committee.
Congressman Manasco had been defeated for reelection and stayed on
the Hoover Commission in a lame duck capacity. Outstanding legis-
lative supporters of the Commission idea, like Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.,
were not appointed to it. In the case of Senator McClellan, who became
chairman of the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments after the Democratic victory in the 1948 elections, special
status was given to a man who has subsequently sabotaged the impor-
tant Commission recommendation for two-house veto of reorganiza-
tion plans.
In conducting its investigation the Hoover Commission early de-
cided to delegate detailed study to special "task forces." First sessions
of the Commission were devoted to dividing the prospective work into
functional and departmental segments and selection of persons and
1949]
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organizations to assume responsibility for investigating these seg-
ments. 1 Ultimately some 24 task forces, with some 300 outstanding
experts participating, made the detailed investigations. The Commis-
sion Reports are based upon the task force studies, many of which have
been printed as appendices A to R of the Commission reports proper.
In thus decentralizing the detailed investigations to task force
groups the Commission was able to enlist the services of outstanding
men from public life, private business and the academic profession.
The Commission recommendations are strengthened by such testimon-
ial support. The alternative of centralizing the investigations in the
Commission and of developing a large staff of experts and researchers
under immediate Commission supervision was rejected.
On the whole the task forces did quite creditable work and some
of them made first-rate studies. On the other hand, a few of the task
forces, notably the one studying Federal Field Offices, were complete
failures. This has made for some gaps in the Hoover Commission
findings and recommendations. The task force approach placed a pre-
mium upon central coordination of 24 separate investigations and, from
the hindsight point of view, can be criticized as leaving the Commission
with an almost impossible burden of pulling together task force ideas
for inclusion in Commission reports proper. There was, in fact, in-
sufficient coordination of the separate task force investigations. The
great bulk of task force written product proved extremely difficult for
Commission members to digest in the short time available. No doubt
this influenced the Commission in its own choice of filing a series of
reports rather than one report. This investigative approach adversely
affected unity of purpose and style.
The direct printed product of the Commission investigation is for-
midable. The findings and recommendations of the Commission proper
are scattered through eighteen reports and a Concluding Report, con-
stituting over eleven hundred pages of text. In addition, many of the
task force studies were published by the Commission, constituting over
twenty-four hundred printed pages. Finally other task force studies
were mimeographed. It is little wonder that the Congress and the pub-
lic are well aware that there has been a Hoover Commission "report"
but that they are ignorant of its contents.
A careful analysis reveals a total of 277 specific recommendations
by the Commission. Bureau of the Budget representatives were as-
signed the task of working out the details for effectuating the recom-
mendations."2 They concluded that simple administrative action will
carry out 114 of the recommendations. The President will be able to
11 Report on General Management of the Executive Branch, p. ix.
12 See "Condensed Summary of Hoover Commission Reports and Action to be
Taken," 95 Congressional Record (daily edition) 6335-6 (May 16, 1949).
[Vol. 33
HOOVER COMMISSION
effectuate 80 recommendations by reorganization plans submitted for
Congressional approval under the Reorganization Act of 1949. Finally
there will have to be substantive legislation in 106 instances and ap-
propriations legislation in 18 instances.
It is obviously impossible to cover specifically all of the findings and
recommendations of the Hoover Commission. Nor would such a dis-
cussion be desirable. Instead attention will be focused on some of the
major recommendations and underlying ideas.
Perhaps the most important idea underlying the Commission's
recommendations is that the President should be a real Chief of Ad-
ministration. He should have not less power but more power over
administration. This is not a new idea, for it was likewise the key idea
in the Reports of the President's Committee on Administrative Man-
agement. To many sincere citizens, including many members of the
legal profession, this idea smacks of dictatorship. Division and diffu-
sion of power, they think, is a sounder approach; they distrust and
fear holders of public office. But they are wrong. Woodrow Wilson
once wrote:
"And let me say that large powers and unhampered discre-
tion seem to me the indispensable conditions of responsibility.
Public attention must be easily directed, in each case of good
or bad administration, to just the man deserving of praise or
blame. There is no danger in power, if only it be not irrespon-
sible. If it be divided, dealt out in shares to many, it is obscured;
and if it be obscured, it is made irresponsible. But if it be cen-
tered in heads of the service and in heads of branches of the
service, it is easily watched and brought to book."'
13
A second fundamental theme underlying a number of the specific
recommendations is that many federal activities need to be adminis-
tratively decentralized. To this most Americans will gladly say Amen.
Much of the delay, inflexibility and red tape in federal administrative
operations could be alleviated, if not be entirely avoided, through ad-
ministrative decentralization. Too many papers must travel to Wash-
ington for review before decisions can be made. Particularly in the
fields of purchasing and personnel do we find undue centralization.
Assuming that the President should be Chief of Administration, the
Commission investigations revealed all kinds of restrictions and ob-
stacles in his way and commented:
"It is not any one of these factors alone but, like the Lilli-
putian threads that bound Gulliver, it is the total complex of
these restrictions-lack of organization authority; grants of in-
dependent executive powers to subordinate officials; restrictive
controls over personnel; divided controls over accounting and
preaudit of expenditures; diffusion of the spending power of
13 56 Political Science Quarterly 497-498.
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appropriations; overly detailed legislation-that weakens the
powers of management in the executive branch and makes it
difficult if not impossible to fix responsibility." 14
As in so many instances, so in that of improving administrative effici-
ency, much of our difficulty may be traced to the legislative branch.
Real advances, paradoxically, call for the legislature lifting its heavy
hand and allowing greater executive discretion in order to assure
greater executive accountability.
The Commission called for a sharpening of the executive's tools
of management-fiscal, personnel, supply and housekeeping. In the
fiscal field the Commission found much fault with the budget process.
It advocated substitution of a "performance budget," which would set
forth and "analyze the work of Government departments and agencies
according to their major functions, activities or projects," for the exist-
ing budget which concentrates on things to be acquired, such as sup-
plies, equipment and personal services. 15 To enable the tightening of
Presidential controls over spending, a majority of the Commission
advocated an Office of Accountant General, under the Treasury De-
partment, to prescribe accounting methods. With better accounting
Congress, the President and the public would for the first time have
accurate, up-to-the-minute information on the fiscal situation.
In the personnel field the Commission noted that the Civil Service
Commission recruitment procedures have been "slow, impersonal and
cumbersome."' 6 Unlike the 1937 President's Committee on Adminis-
trative Management, the Hoover Commission could not quite come
to accepting the view that the Civil Service Commission should be re-
placed by a single Civil Service Administrator. A compromise solution
calls for strengthening the position of the Chairman of the Civil Serv-
ice Commission vis-a-vis his associates on the Commission, and stresses
that he should "serve as the President's principal staff advisor on civil
service problems."'17 The Hoover Commission was particularly dis-
turbed by the failure to take "aggressive steps to build corps of ad-
ministrators of the highest level of ability with an interest in the pro-
gram of the Government as a whole,"'" and by the inadequate attention
given by Congress to civil service compensation.
Shocking waste was discovered in the chief housekeeping services
-supply, records management and building maintenance. It was found
that the federal government spends more than $6 billion a year for
supplies and holds military and civilian warehouse inventories of $27
billion. Central coordination of purchasing is lacking. Warehouses are
'1 Concluding Report, p. 8.
15 Ibid., pp. 13-17.
16 Ibid., p. 18.
'17Ibid., p. 19.
1 sIbid., p. 18.
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poorly located and carry duplicating inventories. "There have been as
many as 17 unrelated systems of property identification in use at one
time."'19
Turning to the handling of records, a subject long familiar to
lawyers in the management of their own offices, it was discovered that
government records occupy space equivalent to six Petagon buildings.
Fully half of these records are not currently used. The Commission
called for the orderly destruction of useless records and transfer of
infrequently used records to more inexpensive quarters.
To coordinate and tighten up housekeeping activities the Commis-
sion recommended the establishment of an Office of General Services,
to be attached to the Executive Office. It would have subdivisions deal-
ing with purchase and storage, traffic management, specifications, prop-
erty identification, inspection and property utilization. Such a reor-
ganization would produce real savings, the Commission predicted.
So much for some of the President's tools of management. Let us
turn to the operating units of the executive branch, to the great de-
partments and agencies, and particularly to their relations with the
President. The Commission found "there are 65 departments, adminis-
trations, agencies, boards and commissions engaged in executive work,
all of which report directly to the President-if they report to anyone
.... It is manifestly impossible for the President to give adequate super-
vision ... ."20 The Commission made a detailed study of these operat-
ing agencies and many of the recommendations are directed to consoli-
dating them into about one-third of the present number. Departmental
major purpose would be the touchstone for determining where the
various functions and activities would finally be allocated. This process
of reallocation and consolidation is now going on with attendant pres-
sures and counter-pressures and anguished bureaucratic cries. The
President's Committee of 1937 did not succeed in reducing the Presi-
dent's "span of control" to a recommended twelve departments. The
Hoover Commission goal of somewhat more than twenty is an objec-
tive more likely to be achieved.
One area of investigation which might profitably have been devel-
oped further by the Commission is that of collective consideration of
government-wide problems by the President's Cabinet. Since World
War I the British Cabinet has evolved some interesting techniques
for collective consideration and coordination of administrative activ-
ities. The potentialities of the American Cabinet have never been
tapped; an adequate secretariat to prepare the ground in advance for
Cabinet discussions is sadly lacking. While the American President is
entirely free to use or ignore his Cabinet, the Commission would have
91bid., p. 23.2 0 Report on General Management of the Executive Branch, pp. 35-36.
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done well to present some striking proposals suggesting that he should
consider the British experience. The ad hoc interdepartmental com-
mittees suggested by the Commission to deal with individual sore thumb
situations are a poor resort at best. The Cabinet could be developed
into a effective council of material assistance to the President.
Space will not permit further discussion of the detailed Commission
recommendations. Certain it is that federal executive organization has
received the most careful investigation in the nation's history. The
Hoover Commission has laid the administrative structure bare. We
now know most of the facts. The Commission's investigation was con-
ducted with the utmost sincerity and with a total absence of partisan-
ship. Its recommendations, while not startling, offer a constructive
program for improving administrative efficiency in the federal govern-
ment. The Commission, now disbanded, can take credit for a job well
done.
The next step, that of implementing the Commission's recommenda-
tions, is likely to be a difficult one. It is not enough that the President
and a few leaders of the Senate and House be interested in putting the
recommendations into practice. They will only be effectuated if backed
by a strong public opinion. The great danger is that the reforms may
be sabotaged and prevented by the artful diversion of public attention
from the general to the specific. Opponents of reorganization will win
out if they can get the public confused over details. Many specific re-
forms are in the realm of the debatable; and there will be present
those who love to debate.
However, the Commission rightly warns of the "danger of piece-
meal attack." As the Commission points out, "It is essentially true that
large numbers of our recommendations are interrelated, and that fail-
ure to bring about a needed change in one area will greatly diminish
the chances of successful reform in another." 2 1 The history of past
reorganization efforts is eloquent testimony to the ineffectiveness of
piecemeal reform.
Already, just as in the past, vigorous opposition to specific reforms
is arising from the agencies and their clientile groups. Members of the
Senate and House who have a vested interest in the existing admin-
istrative structure will be more than ready to grant exemptions.
2 2 If
the public believes, as it should believe, that the Commission's recom-
mendations represent a well-rounded program for administrative im-
provement, it will be well advised to demand their wholesale adoption
without questioning too much the whys and wherefores in specific
instances.
21 Concluding Report, p. 47.
221n this connection we need only note the pressures to exempt the Army Corps
of Engineers.
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